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Abstract – Human factors play a significant role in 
increasing the operational safety of maritime transport 
and offshore facilities. A signiﬁcant number of human 
errors occur during the maintenance phase. However, the 
qualification of human error interpretation before 
undertaking any quantification in the maintenance 
procedure should be given more attention. It is necessary 
to find a reasonable qualitative non-linear based method 
with good interpretation of WHY and HOW accidents 
occur. This provides good insight, sources of risk and the 
possibilities for minimizing the potential risk. As maritime 
operations move into Arctic and Antarctic environments, 
this will become even more crucial. Decision makers must 
therefore be able to recognize how cold weather affects 
human performance and work out how availability, 
survivability or maintenance of a system goes wrong. This 
will help assessors to review the details of the process and 
ask relevant questions rather than blindly finding 
answers. This paper presents a new reciprocal interaction 
of qualitative risk-based methodology for human error 
estimation by applying “Functional Resonance Analysis 
Method” (FRAM). This methodology has the potential to 
be considered the first step of any future quantitative 
assessment for human error estimations. The present 
study is an imperative milestone for coupling between 
nonlinear qualitative and quantitative based methods in 
risk assessment to systematically identify human errors. 
The developed methodology has been applied to a case 
study for the maintenance of a component in a ship 
sailing in a harsh environment. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The study of human factors is an important area of 
maritime engineering that includes the systematic 
application of information related to human 
characteristics and behavior to improve the performance 
of human-machine systems (Kirwan 1998, Noroozi et. 
Al., 2010). It is essential to understand human faults that 
can   lead  to   accidents.  Human  factors   will   help  risk  
 
 
 
assessors effectively look for the cause and effects  
leading  to  an accident in a scenario and consequently 
answer wisely the  main questions in regard to this issue: 
(i) Why does an accident occur (Noroozi. A et al. 2014, 
Abbassi et al. 2015), and (ii) How does it occur (Islam et 
al. 2017). Additionally, considering a qualitative 
interpretation of accident in Arctic conditions is prior to 
any quantitative risk and reliability analysis (Herrera. I 
et.al., 2010, Noroozi. A et al. 2013). Unique 
characteristics of Arctic regions and their effect on human 
performance during maintenance procedures demand a 
methodology accounting for the effect of cold and harsh 
environments in the final estimation of HEPs (Dhillon 
2013, Islam et al. 2016). Some effects of cold temperature 
and harsh environments on human performance are listed 
in Table 1. One of the developed qualitative methods that 
can consider the above aspects comprehensively is the 
Functional Resonance Accident Model with the 
associated Functional Resonance Analysis Method 
(FRAM), (Hollnagel et al. 2014). FRAM is based on 
Resilience Engineering method which defines the ability 
to meet risk (Hollnagel 2012). FRAM approach can 
identify new nonlinear connections and dependencies 
without any limitation for observing the various aspects of 
accident scenarios. In this study, a novel methodology is 
developed based on FRAM to evaluate the resilience of 
the operation in case an abnormality occurred in the 
operation. This means that the methodology does not look 
at a specific accident scenario, but at normal operations, 
where a variation in a function can resonate through other 
functions. It is not surprising then that the resonance can 
create larger variations that lead to an accident. Therefore, 
the aim of this study is to visualize the influences which 
occur between functions and develop a full non-linear 
qualification representation of human error estimation in 
order to better understand the system as a whole and 
optimize HRA process for later quantification purpose. 
The particular area of application is shipping and offshore 
operations. 
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2. BACKGROUND: FUNCTIONAL 
RESONANCE ANALYSIS METHOD  
 
    FRAM is a functional method meaning that it focuses 
on normal variability in the system and considers 
variations in the execution of daily operations (Hollnagel. 
et.al, 2013, Halseth 2012).  It is a risk model reviewing 
non-linear interactions of a social-technical system built 
on reviewing normal operations applying four main 
principles, when things are working as they should be. 
The failures should represent the flip side of the situation 
and to succeed, the system should have the ability to meet 
these risks. The system should have the ability to 
recognize different situations and adjust itself with 
conditions to overcome possible risks (Herrera and 
Woltjer 2010). Each activity or task will be changed by a 
possible variation where the most important of them is 
human fault. Combination of these variations for different 
tasks will result in disproportionately greater 
complications due to its nonlinear effects. These 
variations can reinforce each other and spread through the 
network and cause unidentifiable resonance. FRAM itself 
consist of four steps to analysis a scenario. In the first 
step, the functions and their characteristics to interpret the 
specific stages of a scenario should be identified. 
Function has six aspects in terms of their Input (use to 
produce Output), Output (Result of what the function 
does), Pre-condition (situation that must be true and 
verified), Control (Supervise or regulates a function), 
 
 
Table 1 General Cold Environmental Factors 
affecting Human Performance (HP) 
Stressors Details 
Cold Temperature Breathing difficulty, 
muscular stiffness, frostbite, 
lowered metabolism, 
hypothermia, bulky clothing 
Ice ad-freeze Stiffness of suits impairing 
movement, incapacities 
mechanism, slippery 
surfaces, adds weight/mass 
Combined weather effects Wind, snow, waves-impair 
HP 
Marine Ice Precludes rapid descent to 
sea level, unstable for 
locomotion 
Low visibility Ice, fog, lack of solar 
illumination, frost on 
windows, visor, glasses 
Stress Fear of unknown 
disorientation 
 
 
     Resources (what the function needs to proceed) and 
Time (which affects the availability of function for a 
conditional or certain time stages). Function can be 
illustrated by a Hexagon (See Fig. 1). Functions can be 
classified as two types being Foreground activities which 
represent the main focus of the analysis and Background 
activities which support performance of the set of 
foreground functions. FRAM presents PSF as well as 
barrier functions, as a Background function. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Function model in FRAM 
 
      In the second step, the variations that can emphasize 
the performance of the functions should be identified. The 
description of variability is based on the information 
registered in the incident report combined with a set of 
questions based on the CPCs (Common Performance 
Conditions). The CPCs address the combined huMan, 
Technological and Organizational (MTO) aspects of each 
function (Hollnagel, 2012). The CPCs are used as the 
main determinant of the variability of the functions. The 
combined effect of the CPC is non-linear. Using expert 
judgment and asking related question about variations that 
can change the functions, the variability in connection 
with CPC should be found. Hollnagel, (2005) illustrates 
how the CPCs can be classified according to the MTO 
principle. In the third step, with regard to functions and 
potential functional variability which are identified in 
steps 1 and 2, the network can be constructed. 
Simultaneous occurrences of spreading variability may 
have the effect of resonance which becomes a signal that 
spreads throughout the system and can be introduced to 
find any possible accident scenarios. In the fourth step, 
the variations that a signal can identify in a function 
should be interpreted. One can then elicit the situation for 
preventing the accident or see the cause and effect for the 
occurring accident. Due to lack of preventing options for 
human activities, a resonance can be dispersed to the 
entire network.           
 
 
2.1. A Qualified Risk Assessment Based on 
FRAM 
  
In this study a qualified methodology is developed to 
improve the interpretation of non-linear interactions of 
human activities in marine operations. This will assist in 
surveying potential accident scenario as well as 
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determining possible safety barriers to minimize human 
error. Another insight of this new methodology is that it 
can cover various accident scenarios for a specific 
operation (e.g. pump maintenance in this study) in a 
unique task analysis. By means of FRAM and input 
various signals in the network, one can try to find high 
risk accident scenario in terms of non-linear interaction 
of interpretation of socio-technical system. 
      Application of this methodology and considering 
resonance and monitoring risk in a system which 
provides high values of human errors may help to 
reduce risks which occur due to the human performance 
in a maintenance task. This ultimately increases the 
overall safety and reliability of the process facilities. To 
clarify different steps of the methodology, a flowchart is 
illustrated in   Fig. 2. As is shown, firstly a task analysis 
interpretation for the process should be defined in detail. 
FRAM is embedded to provide a strong visualizing tool 
for developing an accident scenario. A comprehensive 
study will be applied in this section to identify all 
possible variations that affect diverse aspects (six 
parameters related to each function) of the operation. 
Hereafter, identifying functions and potential variations 
helps assessors develop a network in regard to 
introducing reasonable resonance which leads to a high 
risk accident scenario. One can study barriers in this 
step or just leave that for later studies in risk 
management. A risk assessor can track the signal within 
the network and monitor all possible risk in connection 
with each potential variation (Step 2) and non-linear 
interactions of aspects for each function (Step 1). The 
important outcome at this stage (monitoring risk) is to 
observe any possible abnormalities during the operation. 
Therefore, assessors try to impose some barriers to 
minimize the risk. This will lead to categorizing and 
ranking imperative performance influence factors which 
is necessary for further quantitative study.   
 
 
3. APPLICATION OF METHODOLOGY  
3. 1. Scenario Development 
 
A case-study from an offshore process facility 
including pump maintenance procedures is considered to 
demonstrate the application of the developed risk-based 
methodology. The main focus of this study is on 
qualitative assessment of pre-maintenance of a pump used 
in a supply vessel for offshore operations. A FRAM 
network was developed to survey human performance 
malfunction that may cause accidents during maintenance. 
To develop the scenario, it is necessary to define 
background and foreground functions related to all sub-
activities and take a global look at task analysis to define 
the process (Noroozi. A, et.al, 2013). To do this, the 
normal condition should be considered to develop the 
network, but not the abnormal one. This will help us to be 
focused in all aspects of the operation to produce different 
accident scenarios in future.  
 
 
3.2. Human Error Assessment 
 
      The situation considered for analysis in this study is 
an event where a pump is removed and reconnected for 
maintenance from a separation system. During pre-
maintenance, there is a critical task related to ‘draining 
and purging lines’ (Function No. 4 in Fig. 3) and 
consequently it is a Foreground function. It is necessary 
that all isolation valves be closed to remove probable 
obstacles in the way of bleeds or valves, nevertheless we 
cannot perform mechanical isolation. These controls 
should be done in advance (i.e. in foreground ‘isolating 
the component’, Function No. 3 in Fig. 3), so this part 
links to previous Foreground function. However, one 
should also satisfy all other pre-conditions for draining 
purpose.  For instance, it is better to open all valves and 
start the pump to test the lines for pressure or test for 
release check in case there is any evidence of leakage. If 
the pre-condition is not satisfied, then a worse situation is 
expected. Inherently these procedures can be continued 
without verifying the pre-conditions. There will be a 
possibility for ignition due to sparking that can occur as 
the work environment faces up to flammable leakage. 
That is why the detector should find error (another pre-
condition to damp the error for imprecise tests and 
controls for previous background functions ‘detectors’ 
and ‘tests’). One certain time condition is still remaining, 
and that is depressurizing the line. It should be done from 
previous foreground (function No. 3 in Fig. 3). These 
conditions help to purge the lines and consequently let us 
get rid of any possible splashes, spray or leaking fluid in 
site. By satisfying all these aspects, there is an output for 
the ‘complete disassembly’ (function No. 5 in Fig. 3), to 
break containment and be ready for motor tests. The main 
reason for the variability of this function is the lack of 
training and experience as well as work condition which 
can produce enormous errors. As an example, Table. 2 
shows the aspects of the function ‘Drain/Purge Line’ as 
well as variability that effects functions. Similar tables 
were developed for other functions in this study (Steps 1 
and 2 in Fig. 2). The connections between the functions 
are modeled using the hexagonal representation of the 
functions and drawing a line between the aspects to 
illustrate the link between the aspects of each function to 
each other. In this study, FRAM Model Visualizer (FVM) 
is used to construct the networks. 
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In the FRAM network for pre-maintenance presented in 
Fig. 3, the foreground functions are identified using a blue 
color and background function using green color.   The 
resonance is a detectable signal that emerges from the 
unintended interaction of the variability of many 
functions in the network. The first function that the 
assessors want to impose a signal within is imperative,  
since they should track that signal through the network to 
work out realistic results. (If one provide wrong 
resonance may face up to exaggerated or wrong 
elicitation. This sentence is unclear). In this study, it is 
assumed that the first signal is derived from the earlier 
sub-activities of pre-maintenance, “prepare work” 
(Function No. 1 in Fig. 3). 
 
 
 
 
Most of the functions in this study affected work 
conditions, competence, and stress and equipment 
variability. To better illustrate the track of the signal, each 
resonated function is numbered respectively with a red 
number and is highlighted in a reddish color to emphasize 
the resonance. Based on ﬁeld studies and expert opinions, 
the most probable accident scenario following a human 
error in maintenance procedure of the pump would be a 
release of flammable liquid, meeting an ignition source, 
and the occurrence of a pool fire which can be 
extinguished only if a water sprinkler system is activated 
by a ﬂame/smoke detector. Therefore these barrier 
functions are necessary to be identified for improving the 
safety of the work condition, explained in Table 2.   
 
Fig. 2 Framework of a developed risk-based methodology for human error assessment   
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The ‘Detector’ tries to stop the work due to flame, smoke 
or leakage detection (Step 4 in Fig. 2). Also, there is a 
possibility of failures in ‘detector’ or ‘sprinker system’. 
The signal can then be amplified unexpectedly in FRAM 
by introducing more high-risk conditions, since one of the 
pre-conditions for ‘Drain/Purge Line’ cannot be satisfied 
and it means that function continues with fault condition. 
(for example condition where labor opens an isolated 
valve incorrectly, since it is not labeled before. if this 
malfunction appear as a pre-condition for function No.1 
in Fig. 3in first stage, then the signal should be damped in 
next stages, to reduce total human errors during the 
operation. The same should be done for controlling 
ignition before issuing a work permit (Function No. 2 in 
Fig. 3).  
Based on an event tree developed for pump maintenance 
risk         analysis,        one      cannot     define     damping  
 
 
 
 
 
 
effects efficiently (See Step 4  in Fig. 2), since ET cannot 
provide nonlinear interaction between sub-activities at 
first glance.  Additionally the quantification is based on 
the most probable accident scenario derived from field 
studies and expert opinion, therefore, other possible high 
risk accident scenario are unconsciously inevitable in ET 
(See Loops in 4 in Fig. 2). The methodology will provide 
a clear condition for monitoring risk and accident 
scenarios in a process to describe what may happen due to 
resonance of potential variability. In using this approach it 
is important to understand performance influence factors 
and causes that lead to accidents. This method can be 
regarded as the starting point of any quantitative 
assessment that previous researches use for their HEP 
analysis.    
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 A FRAM illustration for pre-maintenance of pump 
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Table. 2 A FRAM module function description for 
pre-maintenance network (emphasizing Cold 
environment factors on functional variation) 
Name of 
function 
Drain/Purge Line 
Type of 
Function 
Foreground 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Close isolation valves 
Perform mechanical isolation 
Output Re-pressurized the Lines/ Break containment 
Precondition Open valves and fill pumps for pressure and 
leak test 
Stop the work due to flame/smoke/leakage 
detection 
Resource Tools, Area Technician 
 Control Check line for fluid & Pressure 
Check Bleeds & Valves for Obstructions 
Time Depressurizing the line 
 
Variability 
(answer to 
questions) 
1. Conditions leading to variations: cold 
temperature, low visibility, ice ad-freeze, 
competence, availability of resources, 
time pressure 
2. Complete disassemble function will go 
wrong. The main errors stem from, Ice, 
fog, lack of solar illumination, stiffness 
of suit impairing movement, frostbite, 
inadequate measures in Pressure and 
release check function, wrong output 
from isolate the component function and 
failures in detector function 
3. The problem can occur in these 
conditions: 
Wrong valve closed or open unconditionally 
the wrong valve, although pre condition for test 
not satisfied but the task still continues and 
may be no heeds of the test result, tools are not 
available or may be out of order, no controls 
for the line and valve fulfilled, no detecting for 
flame or smoke that may lead to accident. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
      In this study, a qualification risk-based methodology 
is developed to improve the non-linear interactions in 
human activities for accident modeling, identifying 
possible barriers and improving the existing safety 
measures. A systematic methodology using FRAM was 
developed to investigate the role of human error in 
maintenance procedures of a pump. Application of this 
methodology shows that FRAM could provide high 
values to human errors that may help reduce risks arising 
due to human performances in each pre- and post-
maintenance task.  FRAM individually is based on 
resilience engineering that provides a good qualitative 
network to understand the condition in which a process 
can go right although it is faced with unpredicted risk. 
The developed methodology will be a turning point for 
studying interaction between nonlinear qualitative and 
quantitative based method in risk assessment to 
systematically identify human error in maintenance. 
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